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Abstract
In 2020, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) found phishing to be the most common
cybercrime, with a record number of complaints from Americans reporting losses exceeding $4.1
billion. Various phishing prevention methods exist; however, these methods are usually
reactionary in nature as they activate only after a phishing campaign has been launched. Priming
people ahead of time with the knowledge of which phishing topic is more likely to occur could
be an effective proactive phishing prevention strategy. It has been noted that the volume of
phishing emails tended to increase around key calendar dates and during times of uncertainty.
This thesis aimed to create a classifier to predict which phishing topics have an increased
likelihood of occurring in reference to an external event. After distilling around 1.2 million
phishes until only meaningful words remained, a Latent Dirichlet allocation (LDA) topic model
uncovered 90 latent phishing topics. On average, human evaluators agreed with the composition
of a topic 74% of the time in one of the phishing topic evaluation tasks, showing an accordance
of human judgment to the topics produced by the LDA model. Each topic was turned into a timeseries by creating a frequency count over the dataset’s two-year timespan. This time-series was
changed into an intensity count to highlight the days of increased phishing activity. All phishing
topics were analyzed and reviewed for influencing events. After the review, ten topics were
identified to have external events that could have possibly influenced their respective intensities.
After performing the intervention analysis, none of the selected topics were found to correlate
with the identified external event. The analysis stopped here, and no predictive classifiers were
pursued. With this dataset, temporal patterns coupled with external events were not able to
predict the likelihood of a phishing attack.
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1. Introduction
Imagine an employee who works for a top company that boasts both trade secrets and a
robust client list. Facing this particular week, this employee feels like one more misstep could
cost them their position at the company since last week they both missed an important deadline
and went grossly over budget for a project. As they perform their routine email check, they are
hardly on the lookout for a phishing email. They spot an email from a C-level executive from
their company that urges them to update the financial accounts through the link provided in the
email. Since they already feel under the gun, they promptly respond, not aware of the lack of a
security indicator at the top of the browser as they enter in their credentials.
This employee and their firm have just become another victim of a phishing attack: the
moment they entered their credentials was the moment they opened Pandora’s box. It is possible
that they did not even realize something was astray as phishing websites have the ability to
redirect the user to the genuine website once the phishing website has logged the credentials.
Attackers now have access to company secrets, the client email list (that can be sold to the
highest bidder) and the potential to drain money from the company. Not only could the company
be swirling in financial losses and loss of proprietary information, but also brand loyalty and
reputation can be tarnished if the media catches wind of what happened and publicizes the
details. It takes only one person falling victim for a phishing attack to be disruptive.
Phishing emerged by preying on the one thing that security experts originally
overlooked—human susceptibility. A phishing attack is a socially engineered attack that seeks to
deceive unsuspecting users, convincing them to divulge confidential information, whether it be
in the form of user login credentials to a website, social security numbers, credit card numbers,
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etc. (James, 2005). Although the public is more generally aware of phishing attacks, it remains a
popular form of cybersecurity attacks. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) found that
phishing was the most common cybercrime in 2020, with 11 times more phishing complaints in
2020 compared to the phishing complaints in 2016 (Rosenthal, 2021).
Commonly targeted industries or corporations are financial institutions; however,
phishing extends to multiple industries—online gambling, online transactions, social networking
sites, and online shopping. The impact of a phishing attack is hefty: in 2020, the FBI received a
record number of complaints from Americans, with reported losses exceeding $4.1 billion (IC3,
2020). The nature of a phishing attack is in a constant state of flux. Phishing first began in 1995
with hackers posing as AOL employees to obtain paying customers’ AOL credentials. The first
barrage of phishing attacks targeting financial institutions occurred in 2003 against E-loan, Egold, Wells Fargo, and Citibank (James, 2005). More recently, phishing scams resulted in highprofile losses within the carbon market. Posing as the German Emissions Trading Authority,
emails were sent to thousands of firms in Europe, New Zealand and Japan claiming that these
firms needed to re-register their carbon credits accounts. This scam resulted in a theft of around
250,000 permits from six companies worth more than $4 million (Zetter, 2010).
Phishing is considered a subset of spam since both are a form of unsolicited emails;
however, phishing is sent with the malicious intent to steal personal or financial information.
Though both are often sent as bulk mailing (with phishing emails accounting for 50% of all spam
emails (James, 2005)), phishing email techniques are much more sophisticated. A survey
conducted by Network World found that spam filters accurately identify 95% of spam. Coupled
with human detection, the successful delivery rate for spam drops to 1%. Coupling the
sophistication of phishing email techniques with social engineering, phishing emails have a
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successful delivery rate of 5-10% of emails. This indicates that social engineering enables
phishing emails to bypass most human detection filters and the sophistication of techniques
allows roughly 15% of phishing emails to bypass automated filter (James, 2005).
There are various methods of preventing phishing attacks. From the technical side,
server-side filters, heuristic approaches, and rule-based approaches exist to identify phishing
emails and prevent them from ever reaching an end user’s inbox. Whitelists or blacklists are also
used to block phishing emails; however, an entry is only added to the list once a phishing attack
has successfully been sent to the end user. Since phishing targets human vulnerability, many
information security experts stress the importance of educating users regarding phishing
detection and reporting suspicious emails. Lastly, subscribing to a cyber-intelligence service,
such as Cyveillance or MarkMonitor, enables a proactive monitoring of the public and hidden
internet landscape to discover threats before any occur. Some companies join consortiums and
warn other members when a phishing attack has occurred. Along the same vein, some companies
will receive a warning through their security software provider, such as Symantec.
The key to stopping phishing attacks lies in proactive detection and tracking of victimzero. According to the Anti-Phishing Working Group (APWG) Phishing Activity Trends Report
for the fourth quarter of 2016, the attack volumes in the second half of 2016 were roughly
equivalent with the attack volumes in the second half of 2015: possibly suggesting a connection
between phishing attacks. Are there underlying temporal trends that can be leveraged to see if a
temporal pattern among topics used in a phishing email emerges? If a temporal pattern is present,
then one can begin to predict the likelihood of phishing attacks occurring.
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section two lays out the problem statement
for this thesis and presents the research hypotheses. Section three reviews previous research on
identifying phishing attack patterns, why humans are susceptible to phishing attacks, current
phishing defense mechanisms, the impact of a phishing attacks, and on how topic models have
successfully been used in spam detection and other applications to analyze a body of text.
Section four discusses the methodology for temporal pattern analysis of phishing topics. Finally,
sections five and six close with the results of the analyses and a discussion of the findings.

2. Problem Statement
Phishing is a damaging cybersecurity attack that preys on human susceptibility.
Successful phishing attacks can wreak both financial and non-financial losses. Different methods
exist to prevent phishing attacks, though these methods are usually reactionary in nature as most
defense mechanisms activate once a phishing campaign has been launched; for example, a rulebased approach is formed based on prior phishing attacks and, in the case of being an embedded
email server filter, will identify phishing emails that are en route to a victim’s inbox.
For a proactive approach to phishing prevention, one would have to be able to predict
some aspect of an upcoming phishing campaign. While the attack volume has been increasing
since 2006, attack volumes for the second half of 2016 had a similar pattern to the second half of
the prior year. Capitalizing on these temporal patterns, a likelihood estimator of the frequency of
phishing attacks can be created. While trends have been analyzed, these trends have only looked
at attack volumes. By looking at the prevalence of phishing email subject lines, one can begin to
note which topics are popular during certain times of the year and which topics tend to occur
after a newsworthy event (such as a hurricane). Once correlations between phishing topics and
Page 8 of 69

newsworthy events are established, one can develop a prediction model that estimates when—
following a specific event—a phishing attack (with a certain subject) will occur.
Before beginning to leverage temporal patterns for a particular topic, one must detect the
existence of topics within phishing attacks. A Latent Dirichlet allocation (LDA) model, a type of
topic model, will discover latent topics that exist within the phishing email corpus. It is expected
that these topics exist since it has been previously shown that LDA has been successfully applied
to study the latent structure of a corpus of emails, leading to the first hypothesis.
H1. Distinct phishing topics exist within a corpus of phishing emails.
Frequency of occurrence for these topics will be used to investigate phishing topic trends
and to define life cycles for each topic. It is hypothesized that life cycles for phishing topics exist
in the corpus. Defining life cycles for each phishing topic would permit the identification of
historical patterns. Furthermore, if these life cycles are defined, then it is possible to determine
which, if any, topics behave similarly.
H2a. Latent topics uncovered within the phishing corpus exhibit temporal patterns such that a
life cycle can be defined for a topic.
H2b. Latent topics can be grouped together based on similarity.
After examining for trends, temporal relationships between influencing external events
and phishing topics will be investigated. During this investigation, the aim is to detect a
relationship between phishing topics and days since an event. Thus, it is hypothesized that
current phishing topics follow historical patterns, which can then be used to predict the future
behavior of the topics. Being able to define a life cycle for a phishing topic will aid in developing
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a classifier that will predict if a certain phishing topic is more likely to occur within a defined
time frame.
H3. The behavior of a topic’s life cycle is influenced by an event occurring. Leveraging temporal
patterns and its relationship to an influential external event, a predictive model can be developed
to estimate the likelihood of when a phishing email topic will occur.
Successfully developing a phishing topic prediction model will facilitate in mitigating the
damaging effects of phishing. By establishing a proactive approach, security experts can better
identify, educate users to potential threats, and stop attacks. A predictive model may be able to
help curb the damage done by phishing attacks.

3. Literature Review
Understanding the current state of phishing defense mechanism, trends within phishing
and why phishing is still successful will be discussed in this section. This section will explore
why, despite an increasing awareness to phishing attacks, phishing attacks are still effective.
Then the section will mention a handful of current technologies that facilitate phishing
prevention. Additionally, the section will dive into topic modelling and how topic modelling has
aided in phishing and spam detection and other use-case scenarios that show the effectiveness of
topic models when analyzing a corpus of documents.
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3.1 Phishing Attack Patterns
A few researchers have investigated current phishing attack patterns. Riedle (2016)
utilized data from APWG, an international group focused on raising awareness of and preventing
cybercrime, and PhishTank, an anti-phishing site, to review historic phishing attacks and identify
any underlying attack patterns. Both of those data sources depend upon user submission, who
may reside globally. The study noted that there is an increase in percentage of phishing attacks
during popular events such as the Superbowl, holidays and the Soccer World Cup. Examining
phishing attacks over the past 10 years has revealed that November to January and March to May
are popular months for phishing attacks, possibly due to those time frames coinciding with the
holiday season and the US tax season, respectively. Additionally, the study found spikes in
phishing attacks around summer and fall of 2012. This spike was theorized to occur due to the
Summer Olympics and/or US presidential elections.
Multiple articles warn the public of the tendency of phishing emails to occur following
times of general uncertainty and key calendar moments. In 2020 when tax filing deadline was
extended to May and then again to July, GreatHorn, an email security solutions company,
observed a 78% increase in the quantity of phishing email campaigns after each deadline
extension announcement. GreatHorn also noted that phishing email campaigns increased during
the week of the standard tax deadline; in 2020, phishing emails increased 167% week-over-week
during the week of the standard tax deadline (GreatHorn, 2021). A period of uncertainty that
scammers took advantage of was the emergence of the COVID-19 virus. Spikes in COVID-19
phishing attacks started appearing in March 2020 when the virus was declared a pandemic and
reached a peak in the third and fourth weeks of April 2020 (Rosenthal, 2021).
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In addition to summarizing recent approaches to phishing detection, Tewari, Jain and
Gupta (2016) provide insights into phishing trends. Rather than phishing attacks targeting
advertisement websites and blogs, the attention has shifted to social media sites. Phishers are
now adopting more advanced tricks such as sending promotional and monetary emails to
unsuspecting users. Lastly, this article credits financial benefits, identity concealing, and fame
and notoriety as motivators for phishers to launch phishing attacks.

3.2 Human Susceptibility to Phishing
Since phishing is a cybersecurity attack that exploits human vulnerability, many studies
have explored what exactly it is that allows phishing attacks to bypass human detection.
Vishwanath et al. (2011) developed an integrated, information processing model of humans’
susceptibility to phishing that predicted roughly 50% of individuals’ likelihood to respond to
phishing emails. Research found that habitual media use was a major contributor to phishing
susceptibility, which is possibly explained by an increase in inattentiveness and automatic
responses to patterned stimuli. Level of involvement, email load, and urgency cues in emails
were found to be key predictors of phishing susceptibility. Overall, the study identified two
reasons why people get phished. Firstly, people do not adequately process the information
present in an email and will often rely on simple cues, like level of urgency, rather than check for
grammar and spelling or identifying the sender of the email. Secondly, automatic responses are
often trigged when looking at genuine-looking emails in the presence of high email load in
individuals who are accustomed to using email. The authors suggest devoting separate time each
day to reading emails and a separate time to answering emails to decrease phishing
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susceptibility. Another way to increase recognition of phishing emails is to use multiple email
addresses for specific purposes.
Canfield et al. (2019) considered the impact of metacognition during phishing detection
and studies whether metacognition is different when detecting a legitimate email versus a
phishing email. When subjects were making determinations as to whether an email was phishing
or legitimate, they were also asked to rate their confidence level in their judgement. Results
showed that subjects were more successful at selecting phishes when they were 100% confident
in their decision, suggesting they learned and were applying phishing detection heuristics in
those cases. Those participants who were already averse to the negative consequences of falling
victim to a phish were better calibrated to detect phishing emails but had a reduced accuracy for
legitimate emails, showing a bias towards classifying emails as phishing.
Alsharnouby, Alaca and Chiasson (2015) conducted a study to see whether modern web
browsers’ security indicators were effective in aiding users to identify phishing websites. The
study found that users pay very little attention to the security indicators (spending only 6% of
their time looking at them) and though confident in their discrimination decisions, participants
successfully identified phishing websites only 53% of the time, on average. Additionally, users’
technical proficiency did not correlate with improved phishing website detection scores.
Parsons et al. (2015) conducted a study to test how the subject-expectancy effect, a
cognitive bias that occurs when the research subject expects an outcome to occur and will
unconsciously create or report the expected outcome, impacts phishing email detection. To test
the subject-expectancy effect, participants were divided into two groups – the Control group and
the Alerted group. All participants were informed that the study was to assess how people
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manage emails. The Alerted group was additionally primed to identify phishing emails. The
study found that informing subjects that they were participating in a phishing identification study
led to those users employing diligent decision-making practices. The alerted group both took
longer to complete the tasks and made better discrimination decisions, though not statistically
significant, in comparison to the other group. The study additionally found that emails from
certain sources, such as government institutions or banks, were more likely to be trusted and
treated as important by the subjects, even if the emails were not legitimate. An implication for an
organization is that its employees who are under either productivity or time constraints may
make poorer security decisions. Unfortunately, this study provides further evidence that humans
are poor at identifying phishing emails (between both groups, approximately 42% of all emails
were incorrectly classified).
Goel, Williams and Dincelli (2017) examined how the contextualization of emails
impacts the targets’ susceptibility to deception. Results revealed that successful phishing emails
fed directly into their targets’ psychological weaknesses (fear of losing something valuable or
anticipation of gaining something desirable). Emails that targeted issues and concerns relevant to
the targeted group were the most successful. Framing the email in a personal context increases
susceptibility to phishing. Participants were less susceptible to a phishing attack when the email
was geared towards social outcomes (e.g., altruism) than for material outcomes.
Wright et al. (2014) investigated human vulnerability to phishing through the lens of
persuasion and motivation theory. The study found that various influence techniques produce
differing response rates, with four influence techniques exerting a significant effect. Out of
liking, reciprocity, social proof, and scarcity as influential influence techniques, liking, which
takes advantage of the fact that people say yes to people they like and know, proved to be the
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most impactful. Participants were less vulnerable to phishing attacks that relied on a fictitious
past shared experience.

3.3 Phishing Defense Mechanisms
Since phishing attacks are damaging, a variety of research has developed technical tools
for phishing prevention. APWG divides phishing defense mechanisms into three groups:
identification methods, prevention methods, and modification methods. Moghimi and Virani
(2016) expands the groups to include four different approaches used to identify and prevent
phishing attacks: blacklist / whitelist, URL evaluation, visual assessment / content evaluation and
hybrid approaches. Ramanathan and Wechsler (2012) extend the groupings to six: network level
protection (block IP addresses or a set of domains from entering the network), authentication
(two levels—user level and domain level), server-side filters / classifiers, client-side tools,
prevention against duplication (making legitimate websites harder to reproduce) and user
education. Mohammad et al. (2014) introduce another category - legal solutions (i.e., US 2005
Anti-Phishing Act) - as a way to combat phishing attacks.
3.3.1 Email Phishing Prevention
Ramanathan and Wechsler (2012) developed a multi-layer server-side filter
phishGILLNET that “tries to catch phishing attacks by the tone, wordings, and other linguistic
variation in the [email] content.” All of phishGILLNET’s three layers employ probabilistic latent
semantic analysis (PLSA) to build a topic model for phishing detection. The first layer,
phishGILLNET1, categorizes unseen data using Fisher similarity. The second layer,
phishGILLNET2, improves upon phishGILLNET1’s performance by using the probability
distributions of PLSA topics as features for an AdaBoost classifier. The final layer,
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phishGILLNET3, refines phishing classification even more by applying co-training to build a
classifier from labelled and unlabeled phishing examples. Leveraging co-training, the classifier is
made more robust using only a small percentage (10%) of data. In order to handle misspelled
words and conjoined words, phishGILLNET calculates the Levenshtein distance for each word
and uses dictionary lookups.
Stembert et al. (2016) redesigned the user interface for an email client to integrate
reporting, blocking, and warning, and embedded educational elements so that users are more
aware and, thus, resist falling prey to email (spear) phishing attacks. This was achieved by
adding a reporting button, blocking, and warning of suspicious email, and providing educative
tips when the user engages with a suspicious email. The proposed user interface offers three
different levels of phishing detection assistance. The first level added nothing. The second level
warned the user and blocked functionalities of the email client when the filters identified an
opened email as suspicious. The third level added embedded training on how to distinguish a
genuine email from a phishing email. The study found that most participants who interacted with
the first level became a victim to the phishing attack. In contrast, most of the participants who
interacted with the second or third stage evaded the attack. Additionally, the study found that the
red header warning the participant of a suspicious email was often overlooked since the
participant focused on the content of the email.
3.3.2 Website Phishing Prevention
Moghimi and Varjani (2016) created a browser extension PhishDetect to detect phishing
attacks in internet banking. PhishDetect can detect zero-day phishing attacks. The rules
embedded into PhishDetect are based on two novel features sets. The first set uses approximate
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string-matching algorithms to evaluate the relationship between the webpage’s content and its
URL. The second set of features identify the access protocol of the page’s resource elements.
These extracted features were then employed in a support vector machine to classify webpages
as phishing or non-phishing.
Huang, Ma, and Chen (2011) proposed leveraging a secondary channel, such as an instant
messaging (IM) service, to deliver one-time passwords to a website during the user
authentication process. A potential drawback would be the IM accounts turning into phishing
targets; however, this pitfall can be mitigated by using existing anti-phishing techniques. The
purpose here is to eliminate the use of a preset password for every website and instead use a
secondary channel to deliver a secret password (assuming the primary channel, such as the
HTTP protocol, is secure).
Yue and Wang (2010) developed BogusBiter, a client-side anti-phishing tool that acts as
an automated fraud prevention tool by sending a massive amount of bogus credentials to
phishing websites. Having to sift through the credentials makes it more difficult for phishers to
discern who the real victims are. Furthermore, the credential verification process triggered by the
phisher will enable the legitimate site to identify the stolen credentials in a timely manner. For
users who install BogusBiter, users’ legitimate credentials will be hidden among the bogus
credentials; the power of this masking ability escalates with the number of users who have
installed BogusBiter.
Marchal et al. (2014) designed PhishStorm, an automated phishing detection system that
analyzes intra-URL relatedness and URL popularity to detect phishing websites. Here the
detection is based on registered domains that are not related to the target brand. Using Storm, a
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distributed real-time computation technique, to infer intra-URL relatedness and the Bloom filter
to reduce calculation time, a “phishingness” score is computed for every URL via a random
forest classifier. PhishStorm achieved a correct classification rate of 94.91% with a false positive
rate of 1.44%.

3.4 Impact of Phishing Attacks
One way to reduce the impact of phishing would be through removing phishing websites
as they appear. Moore and Clayton (2007) investigated the effect of phishing website removal
and reports on trends in regard to both establishing and removing phishing websites. The
distribution of a phishing website lifetime was found to be a lognormal distribution with a
median of 20 hours. Within the first day of a phishing website being established, 18 users
divulge their personal information: after the first day, eight or more users fall victim per day.
Based on conservative extrapolations and lifetime and visitor numbers, banks’ losses directly
attributable to phishing are estimated to be around $160 million each year. The study found that
phishing sites launched before the weekend do not tend to last longer than phishing sites
launched during the week. Additionally, some internet service providers are faster at removing
phishing sites and, in general, once a host is informed to the existence of phishing sites, these
sites were removed much more promptly. The authors conclude that while phishing website
removal is effective, it does not happen quickly enough to act as the only method.
Bose, Chung, and Leung (2014) found that the “release of each phishing alert leads to a
statistically significant loss of market capitalization that is at least US $411 million for a firm”.
Since phishing is a global phenomenon, the authors sought to analyze the impact of a phishing
alert on the market value of global firms by implementing a modified Farma-French three factor
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model that incorporates a global understanding of the firm’s assets. Results showed that the
negative impact is only weakly significant for US firms but strongly statistically significant for
global firms.

3.5 Topic Models
A way to gain more information about phishing attacks would be to apply a topic model
to known phishing emails to understand topics associated with them. Topic models are
probabilistic generative models that allow users to uncover the latent space in a corpus (Lin and
Chen, 2012). When using topic models for information retrieval, researchers are interested in
knowing how likely a document has produced a given query as a random sample from that
document. The likelihood measure is typically computed through two different matching
strategies—literal term matching and concept matching. The unigram language model (ULM)
exemplifies literal term matching, which bases relevance solely on the frequency of words
appearing in the document. In ULM, each document is represented as a mixture distribution over
single words, or unigrams. A drawback to literal term matching is the lack of word usage
diversity. These strategies tend to overfit the training data and generalize poorly to documents
unseen by the model since these new documents likely use a different set of words. With concept
matching, the relevance is based both on the frequency of words occurring in a latent topic and
on the likelihood that the document generates those topics. Within concept matching approaches,
there are two classes of topic models—word topic models and document topic models. Word
topic models study the relationships between words through the latent topic space, whereas
document topic models study the relationship between words and documents through the latent
topic space (Lin and Chen, 2012).
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Popular topic modelling techniques are probabilistic latent semantic analysis (PLSA),
also known as probabilistic latent semantic indexing (PLSI), and latent Dirichlet allocation
(LDA). Each model reduces a document into a distribution of words and will then attribute topics
to a distribution over words. Unlike the mixture of unigrams model, both PLSA and LDA allow
a document to contain more than one latent topic. Topic models have their origins in latent
semantic indexing (LSI); though it cannot be considered an authentic topic model because it is
not a probabilistic model. PLSA is based on LSI (Liu, Tang, Dong and Yao, 2016). LDA, a
three-level hierarchical Bayesian model, is seen as an improvement over PLSA. PLSA will allow
a document to contain multiple topics; however, the distribution of topics is only learned for
those documents on which it was trained. Additionally, the number of parameters used in PLSA
grows linearly with the number of training documents, which suggests that the model is prone to
overfitting. LDA overcomes these problems by defining a k-parameter hidden random variable
as the topic mixture weights. This enables LDA to be a well-defined generative model that easily
generalizes to new documents (Blei, Ng and Jordan, 2003). Mcfarland et al. (2013) presents
other versions of LDA and provides a helpful guide to using LDA. Since it is an unsupervised
topic modelling method, the main challenge is to determine the correct number of latent topics
characterizing a corpus. The authors propose four methods to determine the number of latent
topics present – a topic’s relevance, a topic’s entropy, a topic’s perplexity and asking a subject
matter expert to assess the quality of the topics. Three different variations of the unsupervised
LDA model are discussed by the authors. Firstly, the supervised LDA allows human-generated
topics to affect the learned topics. Secondly, Labeled LDA (L-LDA) assigns each word in the
document to a label rather than a latent semantic space. Lastly, Partially LDA (P-LDA) is similar
to L-LDA but allows more than one latent topic per label.
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LDA serves as the springboard to many of the topic models seen today. Blei and Lafferty
(2009) discuss two other topic models which are extensions to LDA. LDA assumes that topics
are independent: correlated topic model (CTM) allows for pairwise correlations among topics to
exist. LDA assumes that documents are exchangeable; thus, the order of documents within a
corpus does not impact their probability. The dynamic topic model captures the topics to change
over time in a sequentially ordered corpus of documents. Liu, Tang, Yao, and Zhou (2016)
present roughly 16 major extensions of LDA. These models consist of supervised topic models;
models that extend topic attributes to allow topics to correlate with one another; models that
extend document attributes, such as using author and links between documents; and a model that
allows for the generation of words by a topic based on the previously generated word.
3.5.1 Topic Models Used in Phishing and Spam Detection
In the more general field of natural language processing (NLP), researchers have
investigated applying NLP techniques, such as named entity recognition, part-of-speech tagging,
and lexical analysis, to notice the subtleties of language used in phishing e-mails as a way to
build a more accurate classifier. Relying on the trend that phishing emails request users to
perform an action to divulge personal information, Verma, Shashidar, Hossain (2012) created
PhishNet-NLP to infer whether the intent of the email is actionable or informational. PhishNetNLP produces a classifier with a detection rate of at least 97% with very low false positives.
With a precision of 0.996, Aggarwal, Kumar and Sudarsan (2014) used NLP techniques to detect
four characteristics indicative of phishing attacks and later combined these characteristics into a
single score that determined if the email was classified as phishing or legitimate. The four
characteristics were absence of recipient’s name, mention of money, inclusion of a reply
inducing sentence and a sense of urgency.
Page 21 of 69

Only one other article has been found that has used LDA in the context of phishing
detection. Ramanathan and Wechsler (2013) presented a multi-stage approach to detect phishing
attacks and discover the impersonated entity. Stage one uses Conditional Random Field (CRF), a
method of labelling proper nouns in a body of text, and LDA to discover named entities and
hidden topics. Using the named entities and hidden topics as features, the second stage classifies
the emails as phishing using AdaBoost. Applicable only to those messages classified as phishing,
the final stage identifies the impersonated entity using CRF.
More popular in spam detection than in phishing, research has examined how LDA can
be used to improve spam detection. Song et al. (2017) improved the accuracy of social spam
detection on social media sites by employing labelled-LDA and incremental learning. Applying
labelled-LDA to user-generated comments allowed for the creation of topic-based features.
Topics were labelled by applying the most discriminative words, which were identified using a
chi-squared test. Incremental learning allows the classifier to learn new training instances
without having to revisit the entire training set. Many various incremental learning algorithms,
including support vector machine (SVM), classical perception, relaxed online maximum margin
algorithm (ROMMA), and logistic regression, were tested; in most cases, SVM outperformed the
others. It was found that topic-based features improve the overall accuracy and precision but hurt
the recall of spam detection.
Bíró, Siklósi, Szabó, and Benczúr (2008) developed the linked LDA technique to account
for linkage between documents for web spam classification. Linked LDA models the “effect of a
hyperlink between two documents on the topic and term distributions.” Considering linkage is
important because topics in the linked document can directly influence words in the linking
document. Linked LDA allows each document in the corpus to be influenced by and influence
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another document. This method outperformed LDA and other baseline classifiers by about 3-8%
in area under the curve measurements.
3.5.2 Use of LDA in Email Applications / Other Applications
There are numerous applications for LDA outside of phishing and spam detection.
Sharaff and Nagwani (2016) used LDA and nonnegative matrix factorization (NMF) to develop
an email thread identification algorithm. The nested textual clustering algorithm happens in two
stages. In the first stage, LDA and NMF are used to find email clusters within the email
messages. The second stage clusters to find the email threads using threading features among the
email clusters found in the first stage. Both algorithms were compared to the standard k-means
clustering algorithm. Both LDA and NMF performed better than k-means, with NMF performing
the best. Before any algorithm was applied to the email messages, the messages were
preprocessed through stopping and stemming.
Tsolmon and Lee (2014) used LDA to create an event extraction model that combines
user reliability and timeline analysis. To accurately capture reliable low-frequency events as well
as high-frequency events, the model depended upon extracting topics from tweets of active users,
who post information every time an event occurs, and socially well-known users, whose posts
indicate a significant social event has occurred. With a 72% accuracy, the model shows that
timeline and user reliability played an effective role on event extraction. Results suggest that
certain terms may be used more frequently on the day the event occurred compared to other
days.
Dimaggio, Ng and Blei (2013) used LDA to analyze how five American newspapers with
articles published between 1986 and 1997 framed government assistance to artists and arts
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organizations. Here topic modelling aided researchers in comprehending the cultural trends,
moods, and depictions during a time frame in which government assistance for the arts went
from being the norm to being controversial. Another research goal was to understand how the
tone on the matter differed between various newspapers. The study found that negative coverage
of the National Endowment for the Arts (NEA) suddenly emerged with the election of George H.
W. Bush and that the tone of press coverage of arts funding shifted from being celebratory in
1989 to being focused on controversy throughout the 1990s. Furthermore, the study found that
newspapers varied in their press coverage: the Wall Street Journal’s coverage focused more on
controversy while the Seattle Times emphasized more positive stories about government grants
in support of the local art scene. Overall, the authors found that topic modelling is a beneficial
tool that is suited to understanding and exploring large archives of texts. Pairing such an analysis
with validity tests and subject-area experts can aid in answering more focused questions when
conducting a cultural analysis.

3.6 Summary
Many of the aforementioned phishing defense mechanisms, such as phishGILLNET, are
classification algorithms designed to weed out phishing attacks from genuine emails. Some
researchers approached phishing defense either by complicating the actions of the attackers—
BogusBiter and establishing a one-time password—or by prompting users in the presence of
suspicious emails through a redesigned email client user interface. Although the technology
exists to prevent the majority of phishes from reaching the end user, phishing attacks are still
successful due to human susceptibility. The strength of phishing lies in its use of social
engineering techniques, such as urgency cues and framing the email context to be geared for
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material gain, which play directly into human vulnerability. Even when humans are prompted to
discern the legitimacy of emails, humans perform poorly at correct identification of phishes.
Furthermore, these phishing defense techniques are not used frequently enough to be fully
effective; for example, BogusBiter will only protect those users who have it installed.
Examining topic trends of phishing emails provides another venue to enrich existing
knowledge on phishing. As previously mentioned, phishes seem to follow a temporal pattern.
While attack volumes have been increasing over the past 10 years, there are certain times within
a year that attack volumes peak. These peaks could possibly correlate to seasonal events. Also, it
was noted that attack volumes in the second half of 2016 were similar to attack volumes seen in
2015.
Topic modelling extracts topics from a corpus. It has already been successfully used in a
variety of email applications from improving email thread identification to enhancing phishing
classifiers. Various types of topic models exist and many of the more recent developments are
extensions to LDA. Coupling topic modelling with temporal pattern analysis has the potential to
reveal patterns in phishing topics. Building these patterns into a predictive model would create
the possibility of generating a proactive warning to users.
Within their article, Moore, and Clayton (2011) note that “security economics has
identified the lack of reliable information on threats as a key barrier to optimal security
investment”. Furthermore, it calls for a “better measurement of the frequency and impact of
incidents.” Work done in this thesis aims to address this concern by developing a predictive
model of how likely certain phishing email topics will occur in the wake of influential events.
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4. Methodology

Phishing
Emails

Create a
documentterm matrix

Data
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LDA

Verify time-series is
a pattern by running
a Box-Pierce test

Turn time-series
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intensity

Validate quality
of topics
(intrusion tasks)

Develop time series for
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Burst Analysis
K-means
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find life cycle
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Intervention
Analysis

Supervised
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Prediction of how likely
a phishing attack of a
particular topic will
happen

Legend
Hypothesis 1

Hypothesis 2B

Hypothesis 2A

Hypothesis 3

Figure 1: Flowchart of Methodology. The boxes highlight the portion of the methodology whose results directly
provided evidence to reject or fail to reject the respective hypothesis.

4.1 Description of Dataset
The dataset used for this analysis comes from APWG’s Report Phishing database.
APWG allows users to report any suspicious or malicious emails by forwarding those suspected
phishing emails directly to APWG (APWG, 2021). The database tracks details such as the
message header, message content and the entity targeted by the phish. When the data was pulled
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in March 2018, based on APWG’s internal numbering system, there were around 1,190,000
phishing emails. When the data was pulled from APWG’s database and limited to dates between
March 2016 and March 2018, the final phishing email count was around 626,000 phishing
emails. There were phishing emails older than March 2016 contained within the database;
however, phishes before this date were sparse and irregular. While the volume of phishing emails
became steadier within this timeframe, the dataset contains roughly three months’ worth of
missing phishing emails. Most of these dates occur in March, April and November of 2016 and
March 2017.
Phishing emails were parsed into a dataframe where each row represented a single
phishing email. Columns retained information on the ID assigned by APWG, the date the
phishing email was reported to APWG, the sender who reported the phishing email, the subject
line of the phish, and the email content of the phish.

4.1 Data Preprocessing
Not all phishing emails submitted fit the scope of the desired data, resulting in the need to
further trim the dataset. There is no restriction on what a user can submit to APWG so many
emails were in foreign languages, missing structural portions of an email (ex. an email sent with
only a subject line and no body) or merely just pictures. Thus, emails that were in a language
other than English, missing both their subject line and body content or merely a string of random
characters were excluded. Lastly, for emails that had identical content, the duplicates were
eliminated, and the first instance of the email was retained. For those emails that contained blank
content but had a value for their subject line, the subject line was copied into the body of the
email. After these pruning operations, 114,161 emails remained.
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Data fed into the LDA model contained only meaningful words, from which categories
were created. Contractions were converted to their uncontracted form. Numbers, punctuations,
stop words (words frequently used in language like ‘the’), website links and email addresses
were removed. Even after the aforementioned items were removed, strings remained in the email
that were not English words. Strings that contained two or less characters, six or more
consonants in a row or four or more vowels in a row were removed.
Compound words are a linguistic structure that retains a meaning distinct from the two
words that comprise it. Humans can understand this distinction; however, machines will see the
compound word and interpret it as two separate words (Bullard, 2015). To overcome that
limitation, compound words were combined into one word. Bigrams, a sequence of two adjacent
words in a string, helped to identify compound word candidates. Only those bigrams with a raw
count greater than 3,000 were considered as candidates. From this list, bigrams that were
identified as compound words or proper nouns, such as “united” and “states”, were combined
into one word.
Within the corpus, words take on different forms depending upon their grammatical
usage. To normalize the data and reduce the number of tokens, the corpus was run through a
Snowball Stemmer (Stahl et al., 2021). Other stemming options considered were the Porter
Stemmer (NLTK Project, 2020) and the Lancaster Stemmer (Tomcavage, 2001). When using the
most aggressive stemming algorithm, the Lancaster Stemmer, most of the words were
unrecognizable. These tokens needed to be somewhat recognizable to humans since the quality
of the formed topics would be judged by humans later in the analysis. The Snowball Stemmer is
an updated version of the Porter Stemmer. The Snowball Stemmer was chosen because the
words were not chopped to the extent that the word was indiscernible.
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Figure 2: Example of a raw phishing email (top) that has been cleaned (bottom) through the steps described above.

An abundance of gibberish character strings such as ‘iddyiv’ made working with this
dataset challenging. An attempt to overcome this was to run the stemmed words through the
Hunspell spell-checking engine (Gegzna et al., 2016). The Hunspell spell-checking engine
identifies misspelled words and provides spelling suggestions. Misspelled words were removed
from the dataset. Figure 2 provides an example of a phishing email before and after performing
the aforementioned text cleaning operations.

4.2 Discovering Phishing Topics
Before the phishing corpus can act as an input to LDA, it was transformed into a
document-term matrix through a bag-of-words model. Losing the grammatical structure and
word order of the documents, a bag-of-words model tokenizes each document into word-sized
tokens, builds a vocabulary of terms contained within each corpus, and then provides the
frequency for each term. When running the bag-of-words model, an effort was made to obtain a
meaningful dataset that would aid in topic creation. A word had to appear in at least 50
documents: this served to eliminate rare terms that would not aid in clustering. Words appearing
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in at least 10% of the documents were also removed so that these frequently-used words did not
dominate the analysis. Furthermore, after removing the top 10% of words, the vocabulary size
was limited to the 7,000 most common words.
LDA was used to discover the latent topics contained within the phishing email corpus.
One input to be defined for an LDA model is the number of latent topics contained within the
corpus. In terms of model performance, the optimal LDA model is the one that has the lowest
perplexity, a measure of how well a model’s probability distribution predicts test data, since a
low perplexity indicates that the current model generalizes well to new data. To find the optimal
number of topics, the value for the number of topics was initially varied from 10 to 200 in step
sizes of 10. Ninety was selected as the optimal number of topics based on the perplexity score
and the topics produced by each LDA model. The above analysis was run again at a finer
granularity with a step size of one over a smaller range and once again 90 was selected as the
optimal number of topics.
After selecting the optimal number of latent topics, the LDA model hyperparameters
were fine-tuned. A grid search was conducted to find the optimal document topic prior and topic
word prior, using loglikelihood scores to evaluate performance. The results of the grid search
revealed 0.02 as the best value for both hyperparameters.
There are two expected outputs for LDA – a distribution of words for each latent
phishing topic identified and a distribution of latent phishing topics for each phishing email.
Table 1 displays an example of one of the LDA outputs for a corpus of four emails and
three topics. Each row in the table represents a single email and each column indicates the
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probability that that particular topic belongs to that email so as to provide a distribution of latent
topics for that email.
Table 1: Example of a distribution of latent phishing topics for each phishing email in a corpus with four emails and
three topics. Each cell indicates the probability that a topic belongs to an email.

Topic 1

Topic 2

Topic 3

Email 1

0.0995

0.8691

0.0314

Email 2

0.6676

0.1896

0.1428

Email 3

0.7906

0.1726

0.0368

Email 4

0.1403

0.3709

0.4888

The Euclidean distance, calculated on the distribution of latent topics for each phishing
email, was used to measure the similarity between the latent topics. The Euclidean distance
measures the distance between two points, say points x and y, in an n-dimensional Euclidean
space (Wolfram, 2021). Let point x have Cartesian coordinates (x1, x2, x3, …, xn) and point y have
Cartesian coordinates (y1, y2, y3, …, yn). The Euclidean distance between these two points is
defined in Equation ( 1 ).
𝑑(𝑥, 𝑦) = √(𝑥1 − 𝑦1 )2 + (𝑥2 − 𝑦2 )2 + (𝑥3 − 𝑦3 )2 + ⋯ + (𝑥𝑛 − 𝑦𝑛 )2
(1)

Using Table 1 as an example, topic similarity was measured by calculating the Euclidean
distance between each pairwise combination of rows in the table. For Email 1 and Email 2, the
Euclidean distance is
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𝑑(𝐸𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑙 1, 𝐸𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑙 2) =
√(0.0995 − 0.6676)2 + (0.8691 − 0.1896)2 + (0.0314 − 0.1428)2 = 0.8927
This process was continued for all pairwise combinations, creating a topic similarity point
estimate.
As a raw output from the LDA model, the latent phishing topics are not readily defined;
topics were named with human input based on the words associated with the topic.
Running the LDA model addressed Hypothesis 1.
𝐻0 : 𝑃ℎ𝑖𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑡𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑐𝑠 𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑏𝑒 𝑑𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑
𝐻𝐴 : 𝑃ℎ𝑖𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑡𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑐𝑠 𝑐𝑎𝑛 𝑏𝑒 𝑑𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑
To validate the quality of the topics produced by LDA, human input was sought. Two
human evaluation tasks were used – word intrusion and topic intrusion. The premise for both
tasks is the same: when a cohesive set is shown (whether the set be a group of words to form a
topic or a set of topics to describe an email), it should be easy to distinguish the members from

Figure 3: Example word intrusion tasks (left) and topic intrusion task (right). The intruder word is "shop”, and the intruder topic is
"Food | Place | Great | Restaurant | Love | Friend | Order | Really"
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an ‘intruder’ member that is not semantically cohesive. Word intrusion tasks measure the
semantic cohesion of a topic and topic intrusion tasks measure how well the model associates a
topic to a given document. Figure 3 provides an example of a word intrusion task on the left and
a topic intrusion task on the right.
The study recruited eight people, which fits the recommended size for a small focus
group (Tynan and Drayton, 1988). Classifications determined through human input were
compared to the LDA classifications. If the tasks indicate a degree of accordance between the
human classifications and the LDA classifications based on the similarity metrics used for each
task, then the null hypothesis will be rejected.
For the word intrusion task, each subject was exposed to a set of six words and asked to
identify the ‘intruder’ word. Five of the words have the highest probability from the selected
topic. The intruder word was randomly selected from a pool of five most probable words from
the remaining topics. Before it was chosen as the intruder word for the task, it was verified to
have a low probability with the selected topic. Defining the intruder in this way reduced the
chance of the word association to the other words in the set while guarding against the word
chosen as the intruder due to rarity. These six words were shuffled before they were presented to
the subject. Twenty topics were subjected to the word intrusion task – ten were hand-selected
and ten were selected at random. The word intrusion task uses model precision, defined as the
percentage of subjects that agree with the LDA-chosen intruder word, to measure human
accordance with LDA’s classification.
For the topic intrusion task, each subject received a snippet of the email and a set of four
topics: the subject must identify the ‘intruder’ topic. The entire email was not shown to reduce
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the response time for the subjects. Three of those topics had the highest probability of being
assigned to selected document and the intruder topic was randomly chosen from the other lowprobability topics in the model. Each topic is represented by the eight words most strongly
associated with the topic. This task included 12 topics – 10 were randomly chosen and 2 were
hand-selected. The topic intrusion task uses Topic Log Odds (TLO) to measure human
accordance with LDA’s classification. Using the posterior probability of the topic’s correct
assignment to the phishing email corpus, TLO generates a value with an upper-bound of zero
that is achieved when human and LDA judgement agree. It calculates this value through a log
ratio of the posterior probability assigned to the true intruder to the posterior probability assigned
to the subject’s selected intruder. Equation ( 2 ), defining the TLO measure, follows (Chang et
al., 2009).
Let 𝜃̂𝑑𝑚 denote model m’s point estimate of the posterior probability associated with
𝑚
document d. 𝑗𝑑,𝑠
denotes the intruder topic selected by subject s for document d on model m
𝑚
while 𝑗𝑑,∗
denotes the ground truth intruder topic. Here S refers to the number of subjects.

𝑇𝐿𝑂𝑑𝑚

=

𝑚
̂𝑚 𝑚
∑𝑠 log 𝜃̂𝑑,𝑗
𝑚 − log 𝜃
𝑑,𝑗
𝑑,∗

𝑑,𝑠

𝑆
(2)

With the topic odds ratio, the higher the value, the more the human subjects agree with
the LDA’s classification; with this calculation, the upper-bound of zero is achieved when the
human subject selects the same topic as the topic chosen by the model.
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4.3 Temporal Pattern Analysis
Under the LDA model, it is possible for a phishing email to have multiple topics. It was
decided that the topic assigned to the email is the one with the highest probability: for this
analysis, each email only has one topic. Once topics were assigned to emails, the data was turned
into a time series by summing the number of emails appearing each day with a given topic,
creating a time-series for each phishing topic.
Once the topics were discovered and assigned, an initial analysis examined the
distribution of topics over a calendar year to note when spikes in topics occur, the duration that
these topics persisted, and any regularities in the popularity of topics. To aid in identifying the
patterns, the graphs displayed a frequency count over the two-year time period for each topic.
This graphical analysis aided in answering Hypothesis 2a.
𝐻0 : 𝑁𝑜 𝑙𝑖𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑠 𝑐𝑎𝑛 𝑏𝑒 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑑
𝐻𝐴 : 𝐿𝑖𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒 𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑠 𝑐𝑎𝑛 𝑏𝑒 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑑
Here, patterns are defined to occur when correlation exists among the observations. If the time
series consists of independent observations, then that topic has no life cycle pattern. This will be
tested with the Box-Pierce test, which is a statistical test that indicates if the observations are
white noise. These underlying patterns will be leveraged later in the analysis to create the
predictive model.
Phishing topic frequencies were compared using the Longest Common Sequence (LCS)
algorithm, an algorithm that aims to calculate the length of the longest common subsequence
(LLCS) between the given sequences (Petzoldt, 2007). LCS uses the Qualitative Similarity Index
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(QSI) to assess similarity. QSI measures similarity by comparing LLCS to the length of the
longest given sequence. Since LCS works with a string, or sequence of nominal variables, the
frequencies were converted into “High”, “Medium”, and “Low” based on the frequency’s
quartile after normalization. High corresponded to values greater than the third quartile; low
corresponded to values lower than the median and medium represented values in between the
median and the third quartile.
At this point in the research, measurements have been calculated to assess pairwise
similarity between the phishing topics, as well as pairwise similarity between the frequency
patterns of the phishing topics. With this information, the research explored whether similar
topics share a similar life cycle. The Euclidean distances that measured topic similarity were
plotted against the QSI scores that measured frequency pattern similarity to create a scatter plot.
The Pearson correlation coefficient was used to judge correlation. This coefficient takes on a
value between -1 and 1, with -1/1 indicating perfect negative/positive linear correlation and 0
indicating lack of correlation.
After performing the above similarity analyses, the frequency data was turned into
intensity data. Conversion to an intensity signal highlighted the days that had more emails than
usual. Intensity is defined in Equation ( 3 ).
the number of emails of that topic recorded that day
max number of emails of that topic ever seen in a day
(3)
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The intensities were smoothed using a rolling mean with a window of five days. Upon
visualizing, it was decided that analyzing the bursts of activity, rather than the entire intensity

Intensity

signal (Figure 4) could provide additional insights.

Figure 4: Bursts were selected from the entire intensity signal to represent an increased flurry of activity. The entire
intensity is the black line in the figure, whereas the circled portions are bursts of activity. Each circled portion is a
single burst of activity.

After determining the existence of life cycle patterns and turning the time-series into
intensities, a clustering algorithm was run to see if any phishing topics had similar life cycles.
The k-means clustering method, where k indicates the number of clusters to create, is a popular
clustering technique that was applied in this situation. It uses the Euclidean distance to determine
the similarity between two entities. Here the entities are the full intensity signals for each
phishing topic. Since the entire intensity signal is used, all signals have the same length of two
years (the March 2016 to March 2018 timeframe). Clustering answers Hypothesis 2b, which is
contingent upon rejecting the null hypothesis of Hypothesis 2a.
𝐻0 : 𝑂𝑛𝑙𝑦 𝑜𝑛𝑒 𝑙𝑖𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒 𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛 𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑠
𝐻𝐴 : 𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑙𝑖𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒 𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑠 𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑠𝑡
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By rejecting this null hypothesis, dominant patterns among phishing topics can be identified and
membership to these dominant patterns can be assigned for each phishing topic. Having the
intensity signals map to more than one dominant pattern opens the possibility for an external
event to drive the differences in intensity signals.

4.4 Burst Analysis
To begin the burst analysis, bursts of activities were isolated and recorded into their own
data frame. One phishing topic frequency could have more than one burst of activity; in these
cases, the bursts were isolated and treated as independent occurrences. Information regarding
phishing topic membership was retained. A burst of activity is defined as those intensities that
return to its baseline after increasing, span at least five days, and has a spike that is at least twice

Figure 5: Displays an example of identifying bursts of activity within the intensity time series for Topic 27. The
black circles represent the time-series, and the pink line represents the identified burst in activity.

as high as the other intensities. Figure 5 depicts an example of a burst of activity against the
backdrop of its full intensity time-series. Since the duration of the bursts differ, all bursts were
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centered and imputed with values of zero so that all bursts were the same length as the longest
burst. An example of this process is depicted in Figure 6.
Burst 1
Day 1
Day 2
Day 3
Day 4
Day 5
Day 6
Day 7
Day 8
Day 9
Day 10
Day 11
Day 12
Day 13
Day 14
Day 15
Day 16
Day 17
Day 18
Day 19
Day 20

0.5
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.3
4.2
4.3
4.3
0.5
0.3

Burst 2
0.2
0.4
0.8
1.0
1.1
1.0
0.8
0.9
0.7
0.6
0.6
0.5
0.2
0.2

Burst 3
2.1
4.3
4.3
8.6
12.8
10.7
8.6
8.6
4.3
2.1
2.1
2.1
2.1
2.1
2.1
2.1
4.3
4.3
4.3
2.1

Burst 4

0.4
3.2
3.1
3.1
3.1
3.2
0.4
0.3
0.3
0.4

Centered & Imputed

Day 1
Day 2
Day 3
Day 4
Day 5
Day 6
Day 7
Day 8
Day 9
Day 10
Day 11
Day 12
Day 13
Day 14
Day 15
Day 16
Day 17
Day 18
Day 19
Day 20

Burst 1
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.5
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.3
4.2
4.3
4.3
0.5
0.3
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0

Burst 2
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.8
1.0
1.1
1.0
0.8
0.9
0.7
0.6
0.6
0.5
0.2
0.2
0.0
0.0
0.0

Burst 3
2.1
4.3
4.3
8.6
12.8
10.7
8.6
8.6
4.3
2.1
2.1
2.1
2.1
2.1
2.1
2.1
4.3
4.3
4.3
2.1

Burst 4
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.2
0.4
3.2
3.1
3.1
3.1
3.2
0.4
0.3
0.3
0.4
0.2
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0

Figure 6: Example of a dataframe with four bursts captured over a span of 20-days. Over the same 20-day
timeframe, each captured burst happened at different points in time and for various durations. The figure on the left
shows the original dataframe and the dataframe on the right shows the dataframe after all bursts have been
centered and imputed with the value of zero.

Just as cluster analysis was used on the entire frequency to find similarities, k-means was
applied to the bursts to see if there were distinct groups of bursts. Each cluster found by k-means
was characterized by the average of the cluster members; the cluster mean indicated the typical
magnitude of the burst and the number of days the burst of activity stayed above its baseline.
An area of interest was to see if similar phishing topics had similar burst patterns. It
began with a study to see how topically similar the burst frequency patterns were before any
predictions occurred to set expectations on prediction performance. It was expected that if the
burst clusters were topically similar, then a supervised learning algorithm could correctly place
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that member back with its cluster. Cosine similarity judged how topically similar members of a
burst pattern were to each other. After obtaining a baseline, a k-nearest neighbors (KNN) leaveone-out cross validation was executed. KNN classifies a data point based on how its k closest
neighbors as measured by Euclidean distance are classified. This enabled insight into whether a
removed member from a burst pattern cluster would return to the same burst pattern cluster it
belonged to in the k-means clustering results.

4.5 Correlation Analysis & Predictive Model
After studying phishing topic trends, the focus shifted to defining correlations between
phishing topics and notable events. Notable events can either be an event that would make the
headlines in the news, such as hurricanes greater than level 3 that have hit the US and caused
more than $1 billion of damages or a predictable event such as the US presidential elections.
Initial events analyzed are ones that happen consistently and reliably, such as the holiday season.
Intervention analysis determined if the phishing topics were correlated with the event in
question. It does this by capturing the mean level of the time series and noting how much the
mean level has shifted after an intervention, or an external event. Websites used to create the
time-series for the various interventions can be found in Table 3. These time-series contain
zeroes and ones – ones to indicate the days that the intervention took place. The intervention
model extends the traditional ARIMA model by including a transfer function (Montgomery,
2008). There are two basic inputs from which to model the intervention event – step input and
pulse input. From these two basic types, more patterns can be created. A step input models an
intervention that has caused a permanent change to the mean level. Whereas a pulse input models
an intervention that causes a temporary change to the mean level. Interventions for all topics
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were modelled either using a pulse input or a decayed pulse input. In a decayed pulse input, an
abrupt change in the mean level happens and then returns to the mean level. Interventions that
focus on a single day were modelled as pulses; while interventions that are a season or cycle
were modelled as decayed pulses.
If the variables for the transfer function are not statistically significant, then the below
null hypothesis will have failed to be rejected – the specific notable event has no influence on the
phishing topic in question.
𝐻0 : 𝑇ℎ𝑒 𝑒𝑥𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡 ℎ𝑎𝑠 𝑛𝑜 𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑡 𝑜𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛
𝐻𝐴 : 𝑇ℎ𝑒 𝑒𝑥𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠 𝑎 𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑓𝑡 𝑖𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛
Once found, these time correlations formed the basis of a predictive model. Since the
historical pattern that is contingent upon the occurrence of an event has been defined, it is
possible to determine if a phishing email topic is more likely to occur within a certain timeframe
using a supervised learning technique. The sample of the dataset will be split into training and
test sets. A variety of supervised classifiers, such as support vector machine (SVM), logistic
regression, and random forest, will be trained. Model performance will be evaluated using the Fscore, a relevance measure defined as the harmonic mean between precision and recall, and
accuracy produced when evaluating performance on the test set. All the classifiers will be binary
classifiers since the goal of the prediction model is to determine whether a particular phishing
topic is more or less likely to occur on a certain day. More specifically, the classifiers will
determine if a phishing topic is above its constant mean intensity level for that day. Here day
refers to the number of days from a noteworthy event occurring. If any of the classifiers predict
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better than naïve classifier (always predicting the majority class), then the null hypothesis will be
rejected.

5. Results and Discussion
5.1 Findings for Hypothesis 1

𝐻0 : 𝑃ℎ𝑖𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑡𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑐𝑠 𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑏𝑒 𝑑𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑
𝐻𝐴 : 𝑃ℎ𝑖𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑡𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑐𝑠 𝑐𝑎𝑛 𝑏𝑒 𝑑𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑
After adjusting the hyperparameters for the LDA model, the LDA model produced 90 topics
from the phishing corpus. Figure 7 gives an example of the topics suggested by the model.

Figure 7: Example topics produced by the LDA model. LDA does not suggest topic names – that is
left up to the human evaluator to decide. Possible topic names could be affordable fashion (left), job
opportunity (center), mailing lists (right).

Human input was sought for the validity of the topics suggested by the model. Table 2 displays
the results from the Intrusion tasks.
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Table 2: Results from the Topic and Word Intrusion tasks

Task Type

Word Intrusion Tasks

Metric

Model Precision

Set

Average of All Topics

74%

Hand-selected Topics

90%

Randomly Selected Topics

59%

Average of All Topics

-0.89

Hand-selected Topics

-0.15

Randomly Selected Topics

-1.04

Topic Log Odds
Topic Intrusion Tasks

Value

(TLO)

The average model precision for the 20 word intrusion tasks was 74%: on average, the correct
intruder word is selected 74% of the time. Table 2 shows that the average model precision is
higher for the hand-selected topics than it is for the randomly selected topics. A similar pattern
emerges when looking at the results for topic log odds; for the hand-selected topics based on the
TLO, humans agree with the model’s judgements more than in the instance with the randomly
selected topics.
The LDA model was able to successfully find 90 different topics in the phishing email
corpus. With an average model precision for the intrusion tasks of 74% and the average topic log
odds for the topic intrusion tasks as -0.89, these topics are such that humans would be able to
understand them. With this we can conclude that phishing topics can be detected; thus, rejecting
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the null hypothesis of Hypothesis 1. Comparing the performance metrics between the randomly
selected topics and hand-selected topics shows that there is a difference in quality of the topics
produced by the LDA model: some topics are easier to grasp than others.

5.2 Findings for Hypothesis 2A and 2B
𝐻0 : 𝑁𝑜 𝑙𝑖𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑠 𝑐𝑎𝑛 𝑏𝑒 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑑
𝐻𝐴 : 𝐿𝑖𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒 𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑠 𝑐𝑎𝑛 𝑏𝑒 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑑
Hypothesis 2A

𝐻0 : 𝑂𝑛𝑙𝑦 𝑜𝑛𝑒 𝑙𝑖𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒 𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛 𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑠

Hypothesis 2B

𝐻𝐴 : 𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑙𝑖𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒 𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑠 𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑠𝑡

With every topic converted into a time-series, all topics were run through a Box-Pierce
test to validate the existence of life cycle patterns among the phishing topic frequencies. Of the
90 topics, all but four of the topic frequencies rejected the null hypothesis, verifying that the
time-series did not produce white noise. Thus, rejecting the null hypothesis of Hypothesis 2A.
Calculating the QSI score enabled a point measure of similarity between the frequencies
of the phishing topics. Using this point measure against the Euclidean distance of the LDA
model output allowed for further insight into whether similar topics resulted in similar frequency
patterns. Running the Pearson’s correlation test on all the data points, the correlation coefficient
is -0.34, a weak negative correlation. This lines up with what was expected after viewing the plot
of the Euclidean distances against the QSI scores (Figure 8). However, when further examining
Figure 8A, a “tail” in the data emerges. This region appeared to have a stronger negative
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correlation than what occurs when viewing all data points. The Pearson’s correlation coefficient
within this region is -0.71.
By repeatedly running the k-means algorithm on the smoothed intensities and capturing
the Between Clusters Sum of Squares (BCSS) and Within Cluster Sum of Squares (WCSS), it
was determined that the optimal k-means algorithm produces 20 clusters (Figure 10).

Figure 8:
 8A – leftmost figure - The initial Pearson’s correlation test used all data points.
 8B – rightmost figure - Once plotted, an interesting "tail" emerged, and a second Pearson’s correlation test was run on just those data
point.

Figure 9 provides an example of the smoothed intensities, smoothed using a rolling mean with a
window of five days, for a few phishing topics. All of the phishing topic intensities have distinct
periods of bursts of activity. Based on this observation, it could be possible that each individual
burst pattern could be generalized to a set of burst patterns.
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Figure 9: Displaying the smoothed intensities for a couple of phishing topics
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Figure 10: Examining BCSS and WCSS for various values of k

Box-Pierce tests were executed on all 90 phishing topics. Results showed that 95.6% of
the phishing topics were correlated. Since it was determined that the topic life cycle patterns are
not white noise, the research continued to define how many life cycle patterns exist. The kmeans algorithm’s optimal number of clusters was 20. With this result, the null hypothesis of
Hypothesis 2B is rejected. At this point in the research, it has been shown that a frequency
pattern can be made from a corpus of emails by breaking down the emails into thematic topics.
Moreover, when broken down into frequency patterns, the phishing topics do not follow a single
pattern. This enables speculation as to what causes these timing differences within the same
phishing email corpus and still allows the work to proceed to see if extraneous variables can aid
in the characterization of the lifestyle pattern.

5.3 Burst Analysis Findings
Running the k-means algorithm on the identified bursts revealed 20 distinct clusters of
burst patterns. Now that cluster groups were found, the next step was to characterize the burst
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patterns by observing the average intensity. Figure 11 displays the average mean intensity for

Figure 11: Characterizing clusters by displaying the mean intensity for the cluster (red line)
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two randomly-selected clusters – Cluster 9 and Cluster 15. Cluster 9 members are characterized
by an average max peak intensity of 1.5 and an average peak length of 59 days. Whereas Cluster
15 reached an average max peak intensity of 2.5 and peaks for an average of 34 days.
Calculating the pairwise cosine similarity of the distribution of words for each topic
within the cluster gives insight to how similar two topics are. An average of the pairwise cosine
similarity scores within a cluster characterized how topically similar the cluster is. The average
cosine similarity cluster score ranged from 0.733 to 0.880, with a grand average of 0.826.
Another set of 20 clusters was created. Instead of creating this set of clusters using k-means,
members for the clusters were randomly selected. Cluster sizes match the cluster sizes from the
prior k-means algorithm. For the randomly generated clusters, the average cosine similarity
ranged from 0.608 to 0.904, with a grand average of 0.731. A one-sample t-test was run to
determine if the k-means cosine similarity scores were more closely related than the randomly
generated cosine similarity scores. All statistical tests conducted in this section used the SciPy
package in Python. For this test, 0.731 was taken to be the population mean. The null hypothesis
stated that there is no difference between the sample mean and 0.731. The alternative hypothesis
stated that the sample mean is greater than 0.731. First, a Shapiro-Wilk test performed at a 95%
confidence level was performed to determine if the k-means cosine similarity scores were
normally distributed. The Shapiro-Wilk test produced a p-value of 0.889: the k-means cosine
similarity scores are normally distributed. Next, an upper tail t-test performed at a 95%
confidence level was performed and produced a p-value of 1.67x10-8. This result shows that the
phishing topic clusters are more topically similar than if they were to have come from a random
set of 20 clusters.
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After knowing the degree of topic similarity within a cluster, an analysis was done to see
if clusters that are topically similar will have similar peak frequency patterns. The 20 burst
pattern clusters that were found earlier were based on the frequencies of the burst patterns. Since
it is already known that the clusters themselves can somewhat be based on phishing topic
similarity, a KNN leave-one-out cross validation was performed. The results of this crossvalidation effort revealed a 7.2% accuracy. Due to the low accuracy score, it cannot be said that
an email’s topic can be used to predict its burst pattern.
The burst analysis revealed that there are 20 different burst pattern clusters and members
of each cluster have moderately similar topics. However, the findings here do not allow for the
possibility to match an individual topic to a burst pattern cluster. The analysis was hoping to
show, based on the characteristics of the burst pattern cluster, one could predict how long it takes
for that burst of phishing activity to reach its max peak intensity and the duration of that peak.

5.5 Findings for Hypothesis 3
𝐻0 : 𝑇ℎ𝑒 𝑒𝑥𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡 ℎ𝑎𝑠 𝑛𝑜 𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑡 𝑜𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛
𝐻𝐴 : 𝑇ℎ𝑒 𝑒𝑥𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠 𝑎 𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑓𝑡 𝑖𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛
All topics found through the LDA model were analyzed and reviewed for possible
influencing events. After the review, 10 topics were identified to have external events that could
have possibly influenced the intensity of emails over time. The corresponding subjects and
possible event are listed in Table 3.
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Table 3: 10 LDA topics identified to have possible influencing events. Winter holiday season is defined to be midNovember to mid-January. For the recruitment cycle, recruitments tend to occur January through May and again in
September and October.

Topic
Number

Topic Subject

Possible Influencing
Event

Work Cited

1

Weight loss supplements

New Year’s Day

---

5

Stylish fashion

Major shopping holidays

Business News
Daily, 2020

17

Store purchases

Winter holiday season

Doyle, 2018

47

FedEx delivery

Winter holiday season

Doyle, 2018

49

Gift cards, Amazon &

Winter holiday season

Doyle, 2018

Walmart rewards survey
58

Package deliveries

Winter holiday season

Doyle, 2018

59

Apply to a job

Recruitment cycle

Clark, 2018

68

Taxes

Tax season

---

86

How to be healthy

New Year’s Day

---

89

Transfer money, Western

Winter holiday season

Doyle, 2018

Union

Before doing the intervention analysis, all the topics were graphed alongside the
intervention events. Figure 12 displays an example of what the topic’s intensity displayed as a
time series, alongside its suspected intervention event. Essentially, the rest of the chosen topics
displayed a similar trend in which, based on visual inspection alone, the chosen intervention

Page 51 of 69

event did not appear to be correlated to the topic. Based on that observation, the intervention
analysis was skipped for some topics.

Figure 12: Example of a topic's intensity plotted with its possible intervention event. This is the intensity for emails
with weight loss supplements as their topic (Topic 1). The possible intervention event was chosen to be New Year’s
Day.

When examining the significance of the intervention event on the topic intensity, the
significance of the intervention coefficient is analyzed. Figure 13 displays an example of the
results of the Z-test for coefficients. For Topic 1, there are six coefficients associated with the
model. The first coefficient indicates whether the error terms lagged by one day is significant;
whereas the next four terms (ones that begin with “sar”) indicate whether Topic 1’s intensity
lagged by one day, two days, etc. are significant. For the purposes of the intervention analysis,
the last coefficient (T1-MA0) is the coefficient of interest because this coefficient belongs to the
intervention event. As seen in Figure 13, T1-MA0 is not significant. Table 4 shows the
significance test for coefficient results for the 10 chosen LDA topics.
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Figure 13: Topic 1's Z-test for coefficients
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Table 4: 10 chosen LDA topics with results of the Z-test for coefficients.

Topic
Number

Topic Subject

Possible Influencing
Event

Significance of
Coefficients

1

Weight loss supplements

New Year’s Day

Not Significant

5

Stylish fashion

Major shopping holidays

Not Significant

17

Store purchases

Winter holiday season

Not Significant

47

FedEx delivery

Winter holiday season

Not Significant

49

Gift cards, Amazon &
Walmart rewards survey

Winter holiday season

Not Significant

58

Package deliveries

Winter holiday season

Not Significant

59

Apply to a job

Recruitment cycle

Not Significant

68

Taxes

Tax season

Not Significant

86

How to be healthy

New Year’s Day

Not Significant

89

Transfer money, Western
Union

Winter holiday season

Not Significant

Intervention analysis was used to see if external events had a possible influence on the
intensity of the topic it was theorized to predict. Examining the z-test for coefficients of the
intervention variables revealed the intervention variables to be not significant for each of the
topics tested. The next step in the analysis would have been to test various predictive classifiers
to see how likely a phishing topic would occur in the future based on external factors: since the
intervention analysis found no correlations between external factors and the phishing topic
intensity, the analysis ended here, and no predictive classifiers were pursued.
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6. Conclusion
Were temporal trends coupled with external events able to be leveraged to predict the
likelihood of a phishing attack? In short, with this dataset, that is not the case. While no
predictive classifiers were built to determine if a certain phishing topic would occur more likely
than the baseline activity in the presence of an external, influential event, the research confirmed
other pertinent hypotheses.
This work started with around 1.2 million phishing emails and was predicated on the
assumption that 1.2 million phishing emails could be grouped into a manageable number of
latent topics. Not only could these latent topics be discovered but also understood and interpreted
by a human. A task too daunting to be done manually, LDA was used to whittle down the
phishing email into 90 distinct phishing topics. Word and topic intrusion tasks verified that
people could understand how LDA derived these topics.
To study temporal trends, it was necessary to convert the data into a time-series. The
time-series for each phishing topic was a frequency count of emails per day. Before any temporal
trends could be leveraged, the existence of correlation in the data needed to be verified. The BoxPierce tests confirmed that 95.6% of the phishing topics were not independently distributed.
Knowing that a majority of phishing frequencies were not white noise, the research continued to
determine if all of the phishing frequencies conformed to one pattern or if there were dominant
phishing frequencies. If there are distinct groups of phishing frequencies, this would fuel the
possibility that there are influencing factors that could account for the difference in the individual
phishing frequencies. Performing a k-means clustering algorithm uncovered 20 dominant
phishing frequencies. This provided enough validation to continue to see if a predictive classifier
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could be made. The phishing frequencies were turned into phishing intensities to highlight the
days in which more than the expected amount of phishes relating to a particular topic happened.
When conducting a visual analysis of the phishing intensities, some intensities had
pronounced periods of increased activity, or a burst of activity. These bursts of activities became
of interest. If there was a phishing topic on say, puppies for sale, that suddenly experienced a
burst of activity, then perhaps, because it was known that a burst in activity in cats for sale
peaked for a period of five days, one could expect that the puppies for sale burst in activity
would last for around five days. The burst analysis set out to find evidence supporting a
relationship between burst patterns and the phishing topics of the burst patterns. While a k-means
algorithm found 20 dominant burst patterns, the results from the KNN algorithm showed that just
because burst patterns can be clustered together based on intensity, it cannot be assumed that
topic cohesion of the clusters can be a predictive tool.
Before delving into predictive classifier development, the influencing, external events for
a particular phishing topic had to be identified. A manual search through the 90 phishing topics
found ten phishing topics that could have easily identifiable, influencing events. An intervention
analysis revealed that, for this specific phishing email dataset, external events do not influence
the occurrence of a particular phishing email topic. Thus, the search for predictive classifiers
ended here.
While certainly not all similar topics correlate to having similar frequency patterns,
Figure 8 showed the potential for a few similar topics that result in similar frequency patterns.
This avenue was not explored during this work, but that result could point to the possibility of
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having one topic frequency predict the outcome of another, rather than relying on external
variables.
As mentioned earlier, all phishing emails were ones reported by individuals in the APWG
community as being suspected phishing attempts. The database accessed and used were all
malicious and suspicious emails but not all emails were phishing. Many had virus attachments
and little else in the body of the email. 72% of the emails were pictures and resulted in a string of
gibberish characters. These were all eliminated. This reduced the size of the original dataset to
roughly 197,000 emails. Additionally, due to website maintenance and overhauls, the database
shut down for periods of time, resulting in blocks of time without any emails. A timeframe was
selected that had the most continuous dates of emails. This led to a further reduction in the
sample set. Working with a smaller data set over a shorter period of time than anticipated could
explain why discernable patterns were not found. Also, a smaller dataset could have resulted in
topics that were too specific.
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7. Appendix
7.1 Listing of the 90 Topics Produced by the LDA Model
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7.2 Coding Software & Packages Used in Methodology
Language

Usage

Package – Version

Python 3.6.3

Text Cleaning Operations

hunspell – 0.5.0
string – {base}
nltk – 3.2.4

Data Manipulations

pandas – 0.20.3
numpy – 1.13.3
re - 2.2.1
random – {base}
os – {base}
matplotlib – 2.1.0

LDA Model & Cross Validation

mglearn – 0.1.6
sklearn – 0.19.1

R 3.4.2

Time Series Analysis & k-means Algorithm

stats – 3.4.2
zoo – 1.8.2

LCS Algorithm

qualV – 0.3.3

Intervention Analysis

lmtest – 0.9.36
TSA – 1.1
fma – 2.3
forecast – 8.4
Metrics – 0.1.4
pracma – 2.1.8

Page 63 of 69

8. Works Cited
Aggarwal, S., Kumar, V., & Sudarasan, S. (2014). Identification and Detection of Phishing
Emails Using Natural Language Processing Techniques. SIN ’14: Proceedings of the 7th
International Conference on Security of Information And.
https://doi.org/10.1145/2659651.2659691
Alsharnouby, M., Alaca, F., & Chiasson, S. (2015). Why phishing still works: User strategies for
combating phishing attacks. International Journal of Human Computer Studies, 82, 69–82.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijhcs.2015.05.005
APWG. (2021). Report Phishing. Retrieved December 9, 2021, from
https://apwg.org/reportphishing/
Arachchilage, N. A. G., & Love, S. (2013). A game design framework for avoiding phishing
attacks. Computers in Human Behavior, 29(3), 706–714.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.chb.2012.12.018
Bernstein, A., Kaufmann, E., Bürki, C., & Klein, M. (2005). How Similar Is It? Towards
Personalized Similarity Measures in Ontologies. In Wirtschaftsinformatik Proceedings (pp.
1347–1366). https://doi.org/10.1007/3-7908-1624-8_71
Bíró, I. (2008). Latent Dirichlet Allocation in Web Spam Filtering. In Proceedings of the 4th
international workshop on Adversarial information retrieval on the web, ACM (pp. 37–5).
https://doi.org/10.1145/1531914.1531922
Blei, D. M., Ng, A. Y., & Jordan, M. I. (2003). Latent Dirichlet Allocation. Journal of Machine
Learning Research, 3, 993–1022. https://doi.org/10.1162/jmlr.2003.3.4-5.993
Blei, D. M., & Lafferty, J. D. (2009). Topic Models. Text Mining: Classification, Clustering, and
Applications, 10(71). https://doi.org/10.1145/1143844.1143859
Bose, I., & Leung, A. C. M. (2014). Do phishing alerts impact global corporations? A firm value
analysis. Decision Support Systems, 64, 67–78. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.dss.2014.04.006
Business News Daily. (2020, February 21). When to Look for a Job. Retrieved August 25, 2021,
from https://www.businessnewsdaily.com/4817-best-season-job.html
Bullard, J. (2015). Mining and Integration of Structured and Unstructured Electronic Clinical
Data for Dementia Detection, 1586422, 75. Retrieved from
https://search.proquest.com/docview/1675025337?accountid=13042%0Ahttp://oxfordsfx.ho
sted.exlibrisgroup.com/oxford?url_ver=Z39.882004&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:dissertation&genre=dissertations+%26+theses&sid
=ProQ:ProQuest+Dissertations+%26+Theses+G

Page 64 of 69

Canfield, C. I., Fischhoff, B., & Davis, A. (2019). Better beware: comparing metacognition for
phishing and legitimate emails. Metacognition and Learning, 14, 343–362.
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11409-019-09197-5
Chang, J., Boyd-Graber, J., Gerrish, S., Wang, C., & Blei, D. M. (2009). Reading tea leaves:
How humans interpret topic models. Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems
22 - Proceedings of the 2009 Conference, 288–296.
Clark, B. (2018). The 2 Best Times of Year to Apply for Jobs (And When to Avoid) | Career
Sidekick. Retrieved August 20, 2021, from https://careersidekick.com/the-two-best-andworst-times-of-the-year-for-job-hunting/
DiMaggio, P., Nag, M., & Blei, D. (2013). Exploiting affinities between topic modeling and the
sociological perspective on culture: Application to newspaper coverage of U.S. government
arts funding. Poetics, 41(6), 570–606. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.poetic.2013.08.004
Doyle, A. (2018). When Does Christmas Holiday Sales Season Begin. Retrieved August 21,
2021, from https://www.thebalancecareers.com/when-does-christmas-holiday-sales-seasonbegin-3515947
Gegzna, V., Ooms, J., & Schmid, C. (2016, March 18). hunspell/hunspell.R. Retrieved August
21, 2021, from https://github.com/ropensci/hunspell/blob/master/R/hunspell.R
Goel, S., Williams, K., & Dincelli, E. (2017). Got Phished? Internet Security and Human
Vulnerability. Journal of the Association for Information Systems, 18(1), 22–44. Retrieved
from
http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=buh&AN=121069132&lang=zhcn&site=ehost-live
GreatHorn. (2021). Tax Season Is Phishing Season for Email Scammers. Retrieved October 4,
2021, from https://www.greathorn.com/blog/tax-season-is-phishing-season-for-emailscammers/
Guo, Y., Barnes, S. J., & Jia, Q. (2017). Mining meaning from online ratings and reviews:
Tourist satisfaction analysis using latent dirichlet allocation. Tourism Management, 59,
467–483. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tourman.2016.09.009
Hamid, I. R. A., & Abawajy, J. H. (2014). An approach for profiling phishing activities.
Computers and Security, 45, 27–41. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cose.2014.04.002
Hong, K. W., Kelley, C. M., Tembe, R., Murphy-Hill, E., & Mayhorn, C. B. (2013). Keeping Up
With The Joneses: Assessing Phishing Susceptibility in an Email Task. Proceedings of the
Human Factors and Ergonomics Society Annual Meeting, 57(1), 1012–1016.
https://doi.org/10.1177/1541931213571226

Page 65 of 69

Huang, C. Y., Ma, S. P., & Chen, K. T. (2011). Using one-time passwords to prevent password
phishing attacks. Journal of Network and Computer Applications, 34(4), 1292–1301.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jnca.2011.02.004
IC3. (2020). 2020 Internet Crime Report. Retrieved from
https://www.ic3.gov/Media/PDF/AnnualReport/2020_IC3Report.pdf
James, L. (2005). Phishing Exposed. Syngress Publishing. Retrieved from
http://library.books24x7.com.ezproxy.rit.edu/assetviewer.aspx?bookid=10709&chunkid=73
6486448&noteMenuToggle=0&leftMenuState=1
Khonji, M., Iraqi, Y., & Jones, A. (2013). Phishing detection: A literature survey. IEEE
Communications Surveys and Tutorials. https://doi.org/10.1109/SURV.2013.032213.00009
Kim, Y., & Shim, K. (2014). TWILITE: A recommendation system for Twitter using a
probabilistic model based on latent Dirichlet allocation. Information Systems, 42, 59–77.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.is.2013.11.003
Konradt, C., Schilling, A., & Werners, B. (2016). Phishing: An economic analysis of cybercrime
perpetrators. Computers and Security, 58, 39–46. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cose.2015.12.001
Lin, S., & Chen, B. (2012). A Comparative Study of Methods for Topic Modeling in Spoken
Document Retrieval. Computational Linguistics and Chinese Language Processing, 17(1),
65–86.
Liu, L., Tang, L., Dong, W., Yao, S., & Zhou, W. (2016). An overview of topic modeling and its
current applications in bioinformatics. SpringerPlus, 5(1), 1608.
https://doi.org/10.1186/s40064-016-3252-8
Marchal, S., Francois, J., State, R., & Engel, T. (2014). Phish storm: Detecting phishing with
streaming analytics. IEEE Transactions on Network and Service Management, 11(4), 458–
471. https://doi.org/10.1109/TNSM.2014.2377295
Mathews, L. (2016). Homeland Security Cheif Cites Phishing As Top Hacking Threat. Retrieved
from https://www.forbes.com/sites/leemathews/2016/11/29/homeland-security-saysphishing-biggest-hacking-threat/#73c7d3481978
McFarland, D. A., Ramage, D., Chuang, J., Heer, J., Manning, C. D., & Jurafsky, D. (2013).
Differentiating language usage through topic models. Poetics, 41(6), 607–625.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.poetic.2013.06.004
Moghimi, M., & Varjani, A. Y. (2016). New rule-based phishing detection method. Expert
Systems with Applications, 53, 231–242. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.eswa.2016.01.028

Page 66 of 69

Mohammad, R. M., Thabtah, F., & McCluskey, L. (2014). Predicting phishing websites based on
self-structuring neural network. Neural Computing and Applications, 25(2), 443–458.
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00521-013-1490-z
Montgomery, D. C., Jennings, C. L., & Kulachi, M. (2008). Introduction to Time Series Analysis
and Forecasting. (D. J. Balding, N. Cressie, G. M. Fitzmaurice, I. M. Johnstone, G.
Molenberghs, D. W. Scott, … S. Weisberg, Eds.). Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
Moore, T., & Clayton, R. (2011). The Impact of Public Information on Phishing Attack and
Defense. Communications & Strategies, (81), 45–68.
https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781107415324.004
Moore, T., & Clayton, R. (2007). Examining the impact of website take-down on phishing.
eCrime ’07: Proceedings of the Anti-Phishing Working Groups 2nd Annual eCrime
Researchers Summit, 1–13. https://doi.org/10.1145/1299015.1299016
NLTK Project. (2020). nltk.stem.porter — NLTK 3.6 documentation. Retrieved September 26,
2021, from https://www.nltk.org/_modules/nltk/stem/porter.html
Parsons, K., McCormac, A., Pattinson, M., Butavicius, M., & Jerram, C. (2015). The design of
phishing studies: Challenges for researchers. Computers and Security, 52, 194–206.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cose.2015.02.008
Petzoldt, T. (2007, May 31). qualV/LCS.R . Retrieved August 21, 2021, from
https://github.com/cran/qualV/blob/master/R/LCS.R
PhishMe. (2016). Anti-Phishing Best Practices. Retrieved from https://phishme.com/antiphishing-best-practices/
Ramanathan, V., & Wechsler, H. (2013). Phishing detection and impersonated entity discovery
using Conditional Random Field and Latent Dirichlet Allocation. Computers & Security,
34, 123–139. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cose.2012.12.002
Ramanathan, V., & Wechsler, H. (2012). phishGILLNET—phishing detection methodology
using probabilistic latent semantic analysis, AdaBoost, and co-training. EURASIP Journal
on Information Security, 1–22. https://doi.org/10.1186/1687-417X-2012-1
Riedle, M. R. (2016). Identifying trends among phishing attacks. Purdue University. Retrieved
from http://search.proquest.com/docview/1830449791?pq-origsite=summon
Rosenthal, M. (2021). Must-Know Phishing Statistics: Updated 2021. Retrieved September 12,
2021, from https://www.tessian.com/blog/phishing-statistics-2020/
Sharaff, A., & Nagwani, N. K. (2016). Email thread identification using latent Dirichlet
allocation and non-negative matrix factorization based clustering techniques. Ournal of
Information Science, 42(2), 200–212. https://doi.org/10.1177/0165551515587854
Page 67 of 69

Song, L., Lau, R. Y. K., Kwok, R. C. W., Mirkovski, K., & Dou, W. (2017). Who are the
spoilers in social media marketing? Incremental learning of latent semantics for social spam
detection. Electronic Commerce Research, 17(1), 51–81. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10660016-9244-5
Stahl, Peter; Ljunglof, Peter; Benzahia, Lakhdar; Chelli, Assem; Aries, A. (2021). Source Code
for nltk.stem.snowball. Retrieved from
https://www.nltk.org/_modules/nltk/stem/snowball.html
Stembert, N., Padmos, A., Bargh, M. S., Choenni, S., & Jansen, F. (2016). A Study of Preventing
Email (Spear) Phishing by Enabling Human Intelligence. Proceedings - 2015 European
Intelligence and Security Informatics Conference, EISIC 2015, 113–120.
https://doi.org/10.1109/EISIC.2015.38
Tan, C. L., Chiew, K. L., Wong, K. S., & Sze, S. N. (2016). PhishWHO: Phishing webpage
detection via identity keywords extraction and target domain name finder. Decision Support
Systems, 88, 18–27. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.dss.2016.05.005
Tewari, A., Jain, A. K., & Gupta, B. B. (2016). Recent survey of various defense mechanisms
against phishing attacks. Journal of Information Privacy and Security, 12(1), 3–13.
https://doi.org/10.1080/15536548.2016.1139423
Tomcavage, S. (2001). nltk.stem.lancaster — NLTK 3.6 documentation. Retrieved September
26, 2021, from http://www.nltk.org/_modules/nltk/stem/lancaster.html
Tsolmon, B., & Lee, K.-S. (2014). An event extraction model based on timeline and user
analysis in Latent Dirichlet allocation. Proceedings of the 37th International ACM SIGIR
Conference on Research & Development in Information Retrieval - SIGIR ’14, 1187–1190.
https://doi.org/10.1145/2600428.2609541
Tynan, A. C., & Drayton, J. L. (1988). Conducting Focus Groups -- A Guide for First-Time
Users. Marketing Intelligence & Planning, 6(1). https://doi.org/10.1108/eb045757
Verma, R., Shashidhar, N., & Hossain, N. (2012). Detecting phishing emails the natural language
way. In Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial
Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) (Vol. 7459 LNCS, pp. 824–841).
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-33167-1_47
Verras, T. (2009). 4 Best Practices for Fighting Phishing Attacks. Retrieved from
https://www.govloop.com/community/blog/4-best-practices-for-fighting-phishing-attacks/
Vishwanath, A., Herath, T., Chen, R., Wang, J., & Rao, H. R. (2011). Why do people get
phished? Testing individual differences in phishing vulnerability within an integrated,
information processing model. Decision Support Systems, 51(3), 576–586.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.dss.2011.03.002

Page 68 of 69

Watters, P. A. (2009). Why do users trust the wrong messages? A behavioural model of
phishing. In 2009 eCrime Researchers Summit, eCRIME ’09.
https://doi.org/10.1109/ECRIME.2009.5342611
Wolfram. (2021). EuclideanDistance—Wolfram Language Documentation. Retrieved November
11, 2021, from https://reference.wolfram.com/language/ref/EuclideanDistance.html
Wright, R. T., Jensen, M. L., Thatcher, J. B., Dinger, M., & Marett, K. (2014). Influence
techniques in phishing attacks: An examination of vulnerability and resistance. Information
Systems Research, 25(2), 385–400. https://doi.org/10.1287/isre.2014.0522
Yue, C., & Wang, H. (2010). BogusBiter. ACM Transactions on Internet Technology, 10(2), 1–
31. https://doi.org/10.1145/1754393.1754395
Zetter, K. (2010). Hackers Steal Millons in Carbon Credits. Retrieved from
https://www.wired.com/2010/02/hackers-steal-carbon-credits/

Page 69 of 69

